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Dual Banking and State Bank Insurance Powers:

Diversifying Financial Services
Through the Back Door
MICHAEL E. SCEMADER*

INTRODUCTION

The dual nature of the American banking system, providing for both

state and federal chartering and regulation of depository institutions, has
long been defended for its ability to encourage innovation within the
regulatory system.' In recent years, however, there has been concern that

state regulations expanding bank powers beyond traditional depository and
lending functions have become too innovative. 2 Among the innovations of
concern to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (the
"Federal Reserve Board" or the "Board"), and the insurance industry
generally, are the actions of several states to expand state bank insurance
powers beyond both traditional and federally-recognized limits. 3
* J.D. Candidate, 1990, Indiana University School of Law at Bloomington; B.A., 1986,
Brigham Young University.
1. See G. BENSTON, R. EisENBEis, P. Hoavnz, E. KAN & G. KAuFmAN, PERSPECTVES
ON SAFE AND SoUND BANKING 276-78 (1986); W. BROWN, THE DuAL BANKING SYSTEM IN THE
UNra
STATES 59, 64-65 (1968); Miller, The Future of the Dual Banking System, 53 BROOKLYN
L. Ray. 1, 1-2 (1987); Scott, The DualBanking System: A Model of Competition in Regulation,
30 STAN. L. Rv. 1, 13 (1977); see also Interrelationship of the Banking and Insurance
Industries: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess. 41, 47-48 (1987) (oral testimony of Jill M. Considine, New York State
Superintendent of Banks); Letter from Adrian W. DeWind to Governor Mario M. Cuomo
(Feb. 15, 1984) (discussing recommendations of Temporary State (New York) Commission on
Banking, Insurance and Financial Services (DeWind Commission) to allow banks and insurance
companies to expand their services by entering the domain of each other), reprinted in THE
STATE BANKING REVOLUTION AND THE FEDERAL RESPONSE: NEW FRONTIERS OF FnANcIAL

SERvICE EXPANSION 5 (J. Hawke & P. Wallison eds. 1984) [hereinafter BANKING REVOLUrION];
cf. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (powers
must be reserved to states to remold through experimentation, economic practices and institutions to meet changing social and economic needs).
2. See, e.g., Strengthening the Safety and Soundness of the FinancialServices Industry:
Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong.,
1st Sess. 30 (1987) (emphasis in original) (statement by Paul A. Volcker, Chairman, Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System) .(South Dakota statutes granting bank powers far
beyond those allowed for federally chartered institutions create "potentially destructive interstate competition" and "clearly jeopardize the safety and soundness of banks").
3. In the past year the Delaware and Illinois legislatures tackled the issue of whether the
powers of their state-chartered banks should be expanded to include insurance agency and
brokerage activities as well as underwriting authority. The Delaware legislature recently enacted
a bill that gives Delaware-chartered banks, as well as approximately 40 out-of-state credit card
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State banking laws, like their national counterpart, 4 "generally authorize
banks to engage in a series of specified traditional activities and in other
activities that are 'incidental' or 'closely related' to banking." '5 Many state
laws also contain competitive equality (or wild card) provisions that give
state-chartered banks power to engage in any activity permitted to national
banks. 6 A growing number of states, however, have granted powers in the
area of insurance, 7 as well as securities8 and real estate, 9 that go well beyond
the powers given to national banks. It is on these expanded banking powers
that a great deal of regulatory debate is focused.

The Federal Reserve Board, because of its power to control bank holding
companies, 10 is in the middle of this debate. Today, as most state-chartered
banks are also part of a bank holding company," the Federal Reserve Board

banks operating there, power to underwrite and sell insurance on a nationwide basis. Insurance
Compromise is Nearing in Delaware, Am. Banker, Jan. 29, 1990, at 1, col. 5; Act of May
30, 1990, tit. 5, ch. 7, Pub. Act No. 224 (1990) (LEXIS, Codes library, Deals file). In the
Illinois legislature a much narrower bill which would have allowed bank subsidiaries to either
acquire or contract with existing insurance businesses failed to win approval. State Senate
Blocks Bank Insurance Role, Chicago Tribune, June 29, 1990, at 10, col. 5; see also Firmer
Grasp on Insurance Powers, Am. Banker, Feb. 28, 1990, at 2, col. 3 (Board approval of Bank
of America acquisition of state-chartered Oregon bank that could obtain insurance agency
license under Oregon law); Banks Gain New Insurance Powers, Am. Banker, Feb. 26, 1990,
at 1, col. 3 (noting that general insurance services are presently offered in California by
BankAmerica, First Interstate Bancorp and Security Pacific Corp. in response to the 1988
passage of Proposition 103, a California state insurance-reform referendum).
4. Paragraph Seventh of § 24 of the National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 24(7) (1988), grants
national banks "all such incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on the business of
banking."
5. Wallison & Tourney, Continued Banking Deregulation Seems Inevitable, Legal Times,
Mar. 5, 1984, at 14, col. 3 (footnote omitted).
6. Presently 32 states have adopted some form of wild card statute. See 1 R. NATTER,
W. ScHLucHTING, T. RIcE & J. COOPER, BANKING LAW

§

4.03110] (1990).

7. See infra notes 73-81 and accompanying text.
8. See Wallison & Tourney, supra note 5, at 14, col. 3 nn. 11-12 (underwriting of certain
securities, not permitted for underwriting by national banks, are authorized for state-chartered
banks in Alaska, California, Connecticut, Georgia, Massachusetts and North Carolina).
9. See Whiting, Real Estate Activities of Banking Organizations, in BANKING LAW AND
REGULATION 637, 655, 671-72 (F. Puleo & B. Smith eds. 1987) (Federal Deposit Insurance
Corp. (FDIC) survey indicating that 22 states authorize equity participations, 19 states authorize
real estate development activities and 10 states authorize real estate brokerage activities).
10. The Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 ("BHC Act"), ch. 240, 70 Stat. 133 (codified
as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1850 (1988)), imposed federal control over companies that
had interests in state, national or savings banks, as well as trust companies. The coverage of
the Act has been expanded and retracted by amendment, but as a general matter limits the
activities of bank holding companies to managing and controlling banks. The Board of
Governors is the sole administrator of the Act. See infra note 23.
11. FDIC statistics show that in the year ending June 30, 1987, there were 13,955 insured
commercial banks, of which 9,208 were state-chartered institutions. BuREAu OF TH CENsus,
U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATIsTICAL ABSTRACTS OF THE UNITED STATES:

1989, at 490 (109th

ed. 1989) [hereinafter STATIsTICs]. Federal Reserve figures for 1987 (as of Dec. 31) show that
there were 6,503 bank holding companies controlling 9,316 of the nation's commercial banks
(roughly 67% of the banks) and $2,371.5 billion in assets (91.1% of all commercial bank
assets). Id. at 491.
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can construe limitations on holding company activities broadly 2 to severely
restrict the power of states to define the permissible range of activities in
which their own institutions can engage. This raises fundamental federalism
questions concerning state powers 3 and the continued viability of a dual
banking system. On the other hand, the Federal Reserve Board can construe
the holding company restrictions narrowly and grant state regulators broad
license to undermine long-established national regulatory policies which
4
separate banking and commerce.
This Note analyzes a small portion of the debate concerning state powers
by examining the power of state-chartered banks to engage directly in
insurance activities that are prohibited to bank holding companies and
national banks. By focusing on the limited scope of the "closely related to
banking" exception to the nonbanking limits of the Bank Holding Company

12. Section four of the BHC Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1843 (1988), prohibits BHCs from either
owning or controlling any company which is not a bank, id. at (a)(1), or engaging in any
activity other than managing or controlling banks (and other authorized subsidiaries) or
activities that are found to be closely related and incidental to banking. Id. at § 1843(a)(2),
(c)(8). If the Board construes BHC activities broadly to include the activities of a BHC as
well as those of its bank subsidiaries, the powers of the chartering authority (national or state)
to define the range of permissible bank activities will be effectively subordinated to the Federal
Reserve Board-by means of the nonbanking limitations of the BHC Act.
13. "State powers" is used throughout this Note in a very narrow sense to refer to the
powers of state banks that are part of a bank holding company. "State powers" issues in this
narrow sense most often arise in connection with applications to the Board by holding
companies for approval under section three, 12 U.S.C. § 1842, to acquire control of a banking
subsidiary, or under section four, 12 U.S.C. § 1843, to acquire control of a nonbank company.
Fisher, FederalismContraFederalReservism: Bank Holding Companiesand State Bank Powers,
23 U.S.F. L. REv. 317, 324 (1989).
Federal Reserve Board authority over state banks also arises where the state bank is a
member of the Federal Reserve system. 12 U.S.C. §§ 321-327 (1988). Additionally, federal
power is exerted over almost all state banks because of the practical need for deposit insurance.
The FDIC insures 98% of all banks, accounting for 99% of all deposits. N. LASH, BaNKING
LAws AND REGULATIONS: AN EcoNomc PERSPECTIVE 29 (1987). FDIC regulation of state bank
insurance powers, in part because of its focus on risk assessment, permits insured banks to
engage in a range of insurance activities, including (if grandfather provisions are met) the
underwriting of life insurance-provided that there are adequate safeguards in place. Id. at
138; 12 C.F.R. § 332 (1990); see also Powers Inconsistent With Purposes of FederalDeposit
InsuranceLaw: Hearing on ProposedRegulations, 50 Fed. Reg. 23,963 (1985) (notice of public
hearing to amend 12 C.F.R. § 332). As a general rule, the FDIC has placed few restrictions
on the range of activities that can be conducted by federally insured state-chartered banks.
See Bachman, Robinson & Hamlin, Banking Law: New Wave'of Acquisitions Raise Regulatory
and Structural Issues, Nat'l L. J., at 29, col. 4 n.3 (June 11, 1990).
14. See Wilson, Separation Between Banking and Commerce Under the Bank Holdfng
Company Act-A Statutory Objective Under Attack, 33 CATm. U.L. Ray. 163 (1983) (footnotes
omitted):
From the inception of this nation's national banking system, our bank regulatory
legislation steadfastly has maintained a separation between the business of banking
and other forms of commerce. Except for a brief period during the first quarter
of this century, the activities of banks have been limited to the deposit-taking
and lending functions that have long characterized the banking business.
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Act, 5 the Note concludes that the Federal Reserve Board's current (and

proposed) regulatory position represents a statutorily-based middle ground
that is consistent with traditional state insurance powers and a dual system
of banking. This conclusion is based on an analysis of Federal Reserve
Board orders involving applications by Citicorp

6

and Merchants National

Corp. 17

to engage in insurance activities through state-chartered banks, as
well as from an overview of the District of Columbia Circuit Court of
Appeal's AMBAC decision
regulatory response.19

8

and the Federal Reserve Board's proposed

An overview of the basic jurisdictional structure of banking regulation is
set out in Part I. The parameters of holding company state bank insurance
powers are defined in Part II. Part III discusses the nature of state banking
powers. Finally, this Note suggests that current administrative and judicial
positions indicate that insurance powers can be granted by state legislatures

to state-chartered banks without compromising or usurping federal regulatory power-consistent with a dual banking system.
I.

JURISDICTIONAL STRUCTURE

The regulation of America's banking system did not evolve from an
ordered or centralized plan, but instead was formed by a series of responses
to severe economic emergencies.20 While most of these regulatory responses

15. Section 4(c)(6) of the BHC Act states that the nonbanking prohibitions of § four do
not apply where "the Board ... has determined [a particular activity] to be so closely related
to banking or managing or controlling banks as to be a proper incident thereto." 12 U.S.C.
§ 1843(c)(8) (1988).
16. Citicorp, 71 Fed. Res. Bull. 789 (1985).
17. Merchants, 75 Fed. Res. Bull. 388 (1989), petition for review denied, Independent Ins.
Agents of Am., Inc. v. Board of Governors, 890 F.2d 1275 (2d Cir. 1989).
The Board's order in the Merchants National case was in April, 1990, the subject of hearings
before the House Subcommittee on Financial Institutions Supervision, Regulation and Insurance, Implications of the Merchants National Case: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Financial
Institutions Supervision, Regulation and Insurance of the Comm. on Banking, Finance and
Urban Affairs, House of Representatives, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) (House hearing held
April 4, 1990), and before the Senate Banking Committee. Realtors, Insurers Urge Congress
to Close MerchantsNationalLoophole, 54 Banking Rep. (BNA) 723 (Apr. 30, 1990) (discussing
Senate hearing of April 26, 1990).
18. American Ins. Ass'n v. Clarke, 656 F. Supp. 404 (D.D.C. 1987), rev'd in part, 854
F.2d 1405 (D.C. Cir. 1988), modified on reh'g per curiam, 865 F.2d 278 (D.C. Cir. 1989);
see infra notes 85-101 and accompanying text for a discussion of the AMBAC case.
19. Bank Holding Companies and Change in Bank Control; Rescission of Existing Regulation Regarding Investments in Voting Shares of Nonbanking Companies by State Banks
Owned by Bank Holding Companies, 53 Fed. Reg. 48,915 (1988) [hereinafter Rescission
Proposal] (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 225) (proposed Dec. 5, 1988).
20. N. LAsY3, BANKING LAws AND REGULATIONS: AN EcoNoWc PERSPECTrvE 1 (1987).
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tightened regulation and centralized authority, most recent legislation 2' has
moved in the opposite direction-toward deregulation.? This trend toward
deregulation has raised important questions about the allocation of regulatory
powers.

Complicating the allocation of power questions is the forbidding jurisdictional web of federal and state banking agencies. As a general matter, the
regulation of the nation's banks is divided among the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the Federal Reserve Board, the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and state regulatory agencies, with
the role each agency plays depending primarily on the context in which the
regulatory matter is raised. 2a The jurisdiction of the respective agencies is
determined by a number of the characteristics of the particular bank: the
source of the institution's charter (national or state), the bank's membership
21. Legislation particularly important in the deregulation of the financial services industry
is the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. No.
96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (1980) (DIDMCA) (imposing uniform reserve requirements for banks and
savings institutions, eliminating limits on interest rates, expanding powers of iederal savings
and loan associations and granting broad powers to institutions to offer NOW accounts), and
the Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469
(expanding powers of federal saving and loan associations, expanding national bank real estate
powers, and allowing money market accounts to compete with mutual funds). See N. LASH,
supra note 20, at 17-20. In the opposite direction, toward reregulation, is the Financial
Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat.
183 (1989) (FIRREA), which imposed strict capital and accounting standards on savings and
loans and also restricted the power of insured savings and loans to engage in activities "that
pose unacceptable risks to the federal deposit insurance funds." FinancialInstitutions Reform,
Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, [Special Report] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) No.
1298, 2100 (Aug. 18, 1989).
22. N. LAH, supra note 20, at 20-21.
23. The division of labor among various regulators can be roughly set out as follows:

Decision

National
Banks

State
Member
Banks

Insured
Nonmember
State Banks

Noninsured
Nonmember
State Banks

Chartering

OCC

State

State

State

Supervision &
Examination

OCC

State,
Board

State,
FDIC

State

Branching

OCC

State,
Board

State,
FDIC

State

Mergers &
Acquisitions

OCC

State,
Board

State,
FDIC

State

Bank Holding
Co. Activities

Board

Board

Board

Board

Source: Adapted from Hearings on FinancialStructure and Regulation before the Subcomm.
on FinancialInstitutions of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. 619 (1973); and N. LASH, supra note 20, at 33 (Table 2-1). See also Hood,
Statutory Framework, in BAN~iNo LAW AND REGuLATioN, supra note 9.

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 66:295

in the Federal Reserve system, the presence of federal deposit insurance

24
and, of particular importance, the existence of a parent holding company.

Because the Federal Reserve Board is vested with the power to directly

regulate holding company activities, the question of whether a bank is or
is not a part of a holding company may have an important impact on the
scope of the bank's powers.

The number of bank holding companies25 has grown in recent years. Bank
holding companies have become the dominant form of banking organization
in the United States 26 and presently control ninety-one percent of all com-

mercial bank assets. 27 Originally, bank holding companies developed as a
means for banks to avoid the limitations on nonbanking activities imposed
by the Glass-Steagall Act's separation of banking and commerce. 28 Because
a bank holding company was not a regulated entity, institutions were free
to diversify their operations by creating a parent corporation. In response
to the development of holding companies, and the corresponding combi-

nation of banking and nonbanking activities, Congress passed the Bank
Holding Company Act of 1956 (the "BHC Act").2 9 Under the BHC Act a

24. The body of law which governs a bank's insurance powers reflects these basic jurisdictional distinctions, but is also complicated by various policy choices and compromises that
have been incorporated into the laws which control the power of commercial banks to engage
in insurance activities. The extent of a bank's insurance powers depends upon several factors
including (1) whether a state or nationally-chartered bank, or holding company subsidiary, is
involved in the insurance activity, (2) whether the bank or its branches are located in a small
town, (3) the type of insurance activity involved, (4) the total assets of the institutions involved
in the activity and (5) if the entity has previously engaged in insurance activities. See generally
R. Wm-nqo & J. SCOTT, A GUIDE TO THE FEDERAL LAW OF BANKING AND INsURANCE (1989).
25. A bank holding company is statutorily defined as any company which has control over
any bank or over any company that is, or becomes, a holding company by virtue of the
provisions of the BHC Act. 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(1) (1988); 12 C.F.R. § 225.2(c) (1990).
26. Federal Reserve Board statistics indicate a tremendous growth in the holding company
form of organization over recent years-increasing from 121 such companies in 1970 to 6,503
such companies in 1987. STATISTICS, supra note 11, at 491 (Table 795).
27. This 91% figure aggregates commercial bank assets held by both one-bank and multibank holding companies. Id. Multi-bank holding companies (for the year ending Dec. 31,
1987) controlled 72.9% of commercial bank assets. Id. (Table 796).
28. Glass-Steagall is the popular name for the Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). In general industry usage the name
is used to refer specifically to the four sections of the Act (§§ 16, 20, 21 & 32) that separate
commercial and investment banking. 12 U.S.C. §§ 24, 377, 378(a)(1) & 78 (1988). See Miles,
Banking Affiliate Regulation Under Section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act, 105 BANKING
L.J. 476, 476 n.1 (1988).
29. Ch. 240, 70 Stat. 133 (1956) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1850 (1988)).
In Florida Dept. of Banking v. Board of Governors, 760 F.2d 1135, 1141 (11th Cir. 1985),
vacated on other grounds sub nom., United States Trust Corp. v. Board of Governors, 474
U.S. 1098 (1985), the court concluded that the legislative history of the BHC Act revealed
that the legislation had three purposes: (1) to prevent bank holding companies from acquiring
additional banks in a way that would concentrate banking resources in a particular area, (2)
to prevent the combination-of banking and nonbanking enterprises that would enable holding
companies to use bank deposits to finance nonbanking ventures, and (3) to prevent the creation
of interstate deposit-taking networks by bank holding companies without specific state approval.
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bank holding company can engage only in the business of banking or of
managing and controlling banks. Engaging in "nonbanking" activities that
are not "closely related or incident to banking" or acquiring ownership or
30
control of a company which is not a bank is prohibited.
Although the BHC Act removed many of the early advantages associated
with the holding company form of organization, bank holding companies
remain a viable tool for financial institutions to diversify through nonbanking activities and geographic expansion. 3' As a general rule, since the Act's
passage the Federai Reserve Board has adopted a flexible approach in
32
determining whether an activity is closely related to banking.

In its original form the BHC Act provided that nonbanking activities "of
a financial, fiduciary or insurance nature"33 could be determined "to be so
closely related to the business of banking ... as to be a proper incident
thereto."m The Gai-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 198235 amended

(and severely restricted) the BHC Act's "closely related" exception. Title VI
of the Gan-St. Germain Act sharply curtailed bank holding company insurance

activities by taking the position, with certain exemptions,3 that insurance
30. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(a).
31. Fisher, supra note 13, at 377.
32. A two-part test is generally employed to determine whether an activity meets the
exception provided by § 4(c)(8) of the BHC Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8). First, the activity
must be determined to be closely related to banking. The test adopted in National Courier
Ass'n v. Board of Governors, 516 F.2d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 1975), is the generally accepted
standard for determining whether an activity is "closely related." Under the test, courts will
give deference to the Board's finding that an activity is "closely related" if:
1. Banks generally have in fact provided the proposed services.
2. Banks generally provide services that are operationally or functionally so
similar to the proposed services as to equip them particularly well to provide the
proposed service.
3. Banks generally provide services that are so integrally related to the proposed
services as to require their provision in a specialized form.
Id. at 1237; see also Citicorp, 68 Fed. Res. Bull. 505, 508-09 (1982); Note, Approval of
Citicorp'sApplication to Expand Data Services Activities: The FederalReserve Board'sPolicies
Regarding Nonbanking Activities, 1983 DuxE L.J. 423, 426-28.
The second part of the test, derived from the "proper incident" requirement, is a public
benefits test. The test requires that the Board weigh the perceived advantages of the activityincreased convenience to customers and increased competition-against possible adverse effects
such as conflicts of interest and unsound banking practices. See Bogaard, Bank Holding
Companies: Definition, Regulation and Permissible Activities, in BANKING LAW AND REGULATION, supra note 9, at 164-68.

33. Bank Holding Act of 1956, ch. 240, § 4(c)(6), 70 Stat. 133 (1956) (emphasis added).
34. Id.; see also Chittenden, Bank and Bank Holding Company Insurance Powers, in
BANKIuo LAW AND REaULATION, supra note 9, at 492.
35. Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469 (1982) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
12 U.S.C.).
36. The major exemptions (A, B, C, D & G) allow (1) underwriting and distribution of
Credit Insurance (exemption A), (2) selling of limited property insurance (exemption B) (limited
to property securing loan), (3) insurance agency activity in places with populations of less than
5,000 persons (exemption C) and (4) any insurance activities engaged in prior to designated
periods (exemptions D & G) (scope of "grandfather" rights dependent on whether activities
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activities are not closely related to banking.37

The Garn-St. Germain Act's amendment of section 4(c)(8) has done little
to end the political and regulatory debates concerning the permissible scope

of bank insurance activities.38 In fact, the Act has transformed the debate
from one focusing on an acceptable meaning of "closely related to banking"

to one raising basic federalism issues that implicate the continued viability
of the dual banking system. Because Garn-St. Germain precludes a Board
determination that general insurance activities are "closely related," the
precise reach of the BHC Act's nonbanking prohibitions is the central factor
in determining the power of states to define the permissible activities of

state-chartered banks that are part of a bank holding company.
II.

How WIDE IS THE STATE POWERS DOOR OPEN?

The power of a state to regulate its own institutions and the power of
the Federal Reserve Board to control holding company activities have come
into conflict in holding company applications to acquire and retain state
banks under section three of the BHC Act.3 9 Sharp conflicts between federal
and state power have resulted from state legislation designed to expand
bank insurance powers beyond both the limits of Garn-St. Germain and
traditional banking functions. 4°

engaged in prior to 1982 or 1971). See 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8)(A)-(G); see also 12 C.F.R. §
225.25(b)(8) (1990) (part of Regulation Y-interpreting and clarifying section 4(c)(8)(A)-(G)).
37. Title VI of the Garn-St. Germain Act amended § 4(c)(8) to provide that "it is not
closely related to banking or managing or controlling banks for a bank holding .company to
provide insurance as a principal, agent or broker .
Pub. L. 97-320, § 601, 96 Stat. 1469,
1536-38 (1982).
38. Garn-St. Germain's amendment of § 4(c)(8) and the subsequent insurance powers
moratorium of the Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987, infra note 59, are only part of
a continuing effort by the insurance industry to maintain the separation of banking and
commerce that has been a feature of the financial marketplace through most of this century.
One author recently characterized the debate as "a protracted war ... now over three decades
old" between the banking and insurance industries to which "no end is in sight." Huber,
Insurance Powers of Banking Organizations, 8 ANN. REv. BANKIo L. 147, 147 (1989).
39. 12 U.S.C. § 1842 (1988).
40. The perceived state-bank insurance loophole, see infra note 109 and accompanying
text, has generated several proposed legislative responses. See, e.g., Financial Modernization
Act of 1987, S. 1886, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) (allowing state law to determine the
permissible range of insurance activities provided that insurance activities are conducted within
the home-state); Bank Holding Company and National Bank Amendment Act of 1987, S. 706,
100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) (closing the state bank loophole by limiting insurance activities
of holding company banks to those activities that are permissible for the holding company
under the BHC Act); Financial Services Competitive Equity Act, S. 2851, 98th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1984) (extending the Garn-St. Germain Act's insurance restrictions to all state-chartered bank
holding company subsidiaries). See generally Reform of the Nation's Banking and Financial
Systems: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on FinancialInstitutions Supervision, Regulation and
Insurance of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong., 2d
Sess., pt. 3 (1988); Interrelationshipof the Banking and Insurance Industries: Hearing'Before
the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
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The parameters of a state bank's power to engage in insurance activities
is perhaps best defined by two Board determinations concerning applications
by Citicorp4' and Merchants National Corp.42 to engage in insurance activities authorized by South Dakota43 and Indiana, 44 respectively. While the
Citicorp and Merchants National applications are distinguishable in a number of respects, each raises the central issue of whether the nonbanking
prohibitions of section four 45 of the BHC Act reach state banks that are
part of a holding company. The Board's approval of Merchants National's
request required a finding that section four did not restrict state bank
activities. The Board's earlier order concerning Citicorp suggested, but did
not actually reach, a contrary result.
Citicorp applied in June, 1983 for Board approval to acquire all of the
outstanding shares of American State Bank of Rapid City, a state-chartered
South Dakota bank. In connection with its application Citicorp requested
that the Board allow it to conduct nationwide insurance activities through
the state bank. 46 South Dakota law had recently been amended to allow
47
state-chartered banks to engage in all aspects of the insurance business,
giving Citicorp and other large banks incentives to expand their operations
4
in the state. 1
On its initial review of the application the Board noted that the proposed
acquisition "raised significant legal questions concerning the applicability
of the Bank Holding Company Act to state-chartered holding company
banks" and expressed only a "tentative judgment that it could not approve
the proposed bank acquisitions .

. .

.

"49

The Board delayed a determination

of the issue until Citicorp reactivated its application in early 1985. In an
August, 1985 order the Board denied the application on the ground that
the acquisition was designed solely to allow Citicorp to engage in insurance
activities beyond those authorized by the provisions of the BHC Act.
Reserving the precise issue raised concerning the reach of the BHC Act,50
the Board stated that approval would not be "warranted [as] the proposal
would result in a violation or evasion of the nonbanking provisions of
section four of the Act."'1
41. Citicorp, 71 Fed. Res. Bull. 789 (1985).
42. Merchants, 75 Fed. Res. Bull. 388 (1989).
43. S.D. CODNMD LAWS ANN. § 51-18-30 (1984), amended by § 51A-4-4 (1990); S.D.
CODI D LAWS ANN. § 51-16-41 (1984), amended by § 51A-2-40 (1990).
44. IND. CODE § 28-1-11-2 (1986).
45. 12 U.S.C. § 1843 (1989).
46. Citicorp, 71 Fed. Res. Bull. at 789.
47. S.D. CODnD LAWS ANN. § 51-18-30 (1984), amended by § 51A-4-4 (1990).
48. S.D. CODEMD LAWS ANN. § 51-16-40(b) (Supp. 1989), amended by § 51A-2-38(b)
authorizes acquisition of South Dakota state banks by out-of-state bank holding companies
provided that the banks severely restrict any in-state expansion. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §
51-16-41 (Supp. 1989), amended by § 51A-16-41.
49. Citicorp, 71 Fed. Res. Bull. at 789.

50. Id. at 791 n.6.
51. Id. at 790.
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The rationale underlying the Citicorp order, because of the Board's refusal
to reach the BHC Act issue, is not clear. At least three lines of reasoning
support the result reached. First, if Citicorp were utilizing South Dakota
law to "evade" the prohibitions of section four, then it might follow that
state banking powers are effectively preempted by the insurance limitations
of the Garn-St. Germain Act. This would resolve the BHC Act issue raised
and addressed in Governor Rice's concurring statement. Rice noted that
"the nonbanking prohibitions of the Act apply to investments made by
bank holding companies, even when those investments are made through a
subsidiary bank." 52 Such a reading is inconsistent with both the language
of the order (expressly reserving the BHC Act "scope" issue) and the "noncomprehensive" nature of the Act evidenced by its legislative history. 3 An
alternative rationale for the order would be to read into it a finding that
the proposed acquisition was the de facto purchase of an insurance subsidiary, rather than the acquisition of a bank.5 4 This alternative is feasible
given the Board's concern with the limited range of banking activities that
would be conducted and the "preponderance of insurance activities proposed
for [the] -Bank."'5 A third reading of the order would justify the Board's
determination on the basis of geography. This view would effectively nullify
South Dakota's scheme on the ground that while it authorizes Citicorp to
engage in nationwide insurance activities, it strictly limits its ability to
conduct banking and insurance activities in South Dakota. Governor Seger's
concurring statement supports a geographic reading of the order as she
preferred to base the scope of the BHC Act on a territorial limitation.5 6

52. Id. at 792.
53. See S. REP. No. 1095, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 2 (1955), reprinted in 1956 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADmiNa.
NEWS 2482, 2483 (considerable regulatory control over individual
federal and state banks, but only very limited control over bank holding companies that
control them); see also Competition in Banking Act of 1980: Hearing on S. 39, S. 380, and
H.R. 2255 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 96th Cong.,
2d Sess. 22 (1980) (state bank powers depend on state laws, not on provisions of the BHC
Act).
54. In support of this rationale the order states that:
In these circumstances, it is important to note that Bank will serve primarily as
an insurance subsidiary of Citicorp and will conduct relatively insignificant
banking activities .... Under the South Dakota statute, Bank and its insurance
subsidiaries must be licensed and supervised by the South Dakota Department of
Insurance as well as the state insurance departments in each state in which Bank
conducts its insurance activities.
Citicorp, 71 Fed. Res. Bull. at 791 & n.4; see also Chittenden, supra note 34, at 499 (emphasis
in original) ("In effect, the Board decided that Citicorp was buying a direct non-bank subsidiary
to engage in prohibited activities, and not a bona fide state-chartered bank.").
55. Citicorp, 71 Fed. Res. Bull. at 791.
56. Governor Seger stated in part:
I wish to emphasize that I do not object to proposals under which a state bank
engages in activities authorized by the state for its banks provided those activities
may be conducted within the state without restriction. I believe that states should
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Such a reading also reinforces the rationale for a dual system of regulation, 57
and offers a reasonable basis for making the Citicorp order consistent with
5
subsequent Board positions and legislative proposals.
The BHC Act "state powers" question again came before the Federal
Reserve Board in 1987 when Merchants National Corp., 59 an Indiana based
bank holding company, sought to be released from commitments not to
conduct insurance agency activities through two recently acquired statechartered banks. 60 Reaching a result which appears inconsistent with the
result it had reached in Citicorp, the Board granted Merchants National's
request to resume direct insurance agency activities through the two banks.
Distinguishing the application from Citicorp as not involving "evasion" of
section four, 61 the Board's order focused directly on the scope of the BHC
Act's nonbanking provisions.

be authorized to delineate the types of activities that banks may engage in within
their borders. Indeed, one of the virtues of the dual banking system is that it
allows the states to serve as laboratories for the development and expansion of
banking services and activities within their boundaries.
Id. at 792.
57. A geographically-based limitation on state bank insurance powers reinforces the rationale underlying dual regulation that powers are reserved to the several states to develop
new financial services. Such a limit also reflects the "intrastate"-"interstate" distinction so
important in the analysis of federalism principles under the commerce clause.
58. The Proxmire Financial Modernization Act of 1988, S. 1886, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., §
802 (1988), proposed a "home State" rule which provided that states could authorize banks
to provide insurance "to residents of that State, natural persons employed in that State, or
natural persons otherwise present in that State." See Proxmire FinancialModernization Act
of 1988, [Special Report] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) No. 1226, at 38 (Apr. 5, 1988).
59. The Board's initial action on Merchants National's request, 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 876
(1987), was challenged by insurance trade associations in the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, Independent Ins. Agents of Am. v. Board of Governors, 838 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1988).
The court vacated the Board's order on the ground that it violated the moratorium provisions
of Title II of the Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-86, §§ 201205, 101 Stat. 552, 581-85 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1841), which prohibited federal
banking agencies from approving any expansion of bank insurance activities until March 1,
1988. See Hinkle, InsuranceActivities of NationalBanks and Holding Companies, 105 BANojNG
L.J. 137 (1988). After the expiration of the moratorium Merchants asked the Board to reissue
the original order. The Board granted relief and reaffirmed its earlier position. 75 Fed. Res.
Bull. 388 (1989). The insurance associations' petition for review was denied by the Second
Circuit in November, 1989. Independent Ins. Agents of Am. v. Board of Governors, 838 F.2d
627 (2d Cir. 1988); see Abbot, Scott & Barrett, Banks and Insurance: An Update, 43 Bus.
LAw. 1005, 1008 & n.13 (1988); Fisher, supra note 13, at 343 n.139.
60. Merchants National's previous commitment not to conduct insurance agency activities
through the Anderson Banking Co. and the Mid-State Bank of Hendricks County (the banks
acquired) illustrates how the state powers question is complicated by the regulatory practice
of "regulation by commitment." Under this "philosophy," administrative delays in application
processing are avoided through the extraction of "so-called 'voluntary commitments' from
applicants that they will divest bank subsidiaries of certain nonbanking activities or limit the
conduct of such activities." Fisher, supra note 13, at 327 (footnotes omitted). As the ultimate
determination in Merchants indicates, extraction of such commitments may, in effect, be ultra
vires regulation by the Board-abrogating the resolution of state powers questions.
61. See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text.
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The order noted that there are two kinds of BHC Act prohibitions on
involvement in nonbanking: restricting control of nonbanking entities and
prohibiting certain nonbanking activities.62 Rejecting the arguments that
support a unified reading of the prohibitions, 63 the Board reasoned that-the
structure and language of the BHC Act dictated that the prohibitions be
read as separable and independent.64 With respect to the prohibition on
controlling nonbanking entities, the Board (relying on the language of section
4(a))65 ruled that no. entity within a holding company can retain ownership
of voting shares in an entity engaged in activities not "closely related" to
banking." Ownership or control limitations, whether direct or indirect, were
held to apply to any part of the bank holding company. The nonbanking
activity provisions of section 4(a)(2), 67 however, only limit the holding
company's nonbank subsidiaries to banking, managing or controlling banks
and other authorized subsidiaries, and other activities deemed by the Board
to be "closely related to banking."
In short, the Merchants National order indicates that the BHC Act's
limitations on activities apply only to the bank holding company itself and
its nonbank subsidiaries-not to subsidiary banks. Read broadly, the order
supports the proposition that the powers of a bank, even when that bank
is part of a holding company, are subject only to the control of the national
or particular state authority granting its charter. 69 The Board in Merchants
National recognized the relatively independent position of holding company
banks. Such an independent position had been previously advocated by
Citicorp and other holding companies that sought to acquire and operate
state banks pursuant to South Dakota's insurance statutes. 70 Even though
the divided Board in Citicorp found it unnecessary to address the BHC Act
issue,'7 it is clear that the determination (because the application was denied)

62. Merchants, 75 Fed. Res. Bull. at 391.
63. The arguments-for an expansive reading of the nonbanking prohibitions were advanced
by a number of insurance trade organizations in comments protesting the application and the
request to reissue the earlier order. The argument advanced was that the nonbanking "activities"
limitation in 12 U.S.C. § 1843(a)(2) applied not only to direct conduct of the BHC, but also
to conduct engaged in indirectly through holding company subsidiaries, including subsidiary
banks. Id.
64. Id. at 391-92.
65. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(a) (1988).
66. Merchants, 75 Fed. Res. Bull. at 391-92.
67. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(a)(2) (1988).
68. Merchants, 75 Fed. Res. Bull. at 391.
69. See Hinkle, supra note 59, at 138 n.3.
70. See, e.g., Excerpt from First Interstate'sBrief in Support of its Application for Federal
Approval to Acquire a Bank in South Dakota, reprinted in BAN1ING REv0oLurioN, supra note
1, at 37.
71. Citicorp, 71 Fed. Res. Bull. at 791 n.6 (because Citicorp's proposed acquisition was
designed to "evade" the nonbanking provisions of the Act, it was unnecessary to make the
determination concerning the contention that nonbanking and insurance provisions of the Act
do not apply to holding company banks).
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imposed some limits on a state's discretion to define bank insurance powers.
What those federal limits on state power might be is not clear. Merchants
72
National's passing reference to Citicorp as involving "purposeful evasion"
indicates only that the degree or scope of the state authorization for
insurance or other non-traditional activity is a relevant factor that the Board
will consider.
A comparative overview of state banking regulations indicates that the
statutes in question in Citicorp and Merchants National represent the end
and middle of a wide spectrum of state-granted bank insurance powers. Of
states with measures addressing bank insurance powers, South Dakota's
legislation authorizing state institutions to engage in "all facets of the
insurance business ' 73 on a nationwide basis (but with strict limits on
intrastate activities) 74 is the broadest and most controversial. Indiana law,
allowing the "solicitation and writing of insurance as agent or broker" for
any insurance company authorized to do business in that state (excepting
life insurance companies) 75 represents a regulatory middle ground, 76 as do
the statutory provisions of several other states. 77 In four states, along with,
South Dakota, state-chartered banks are permitted to engage in insurance
underwriting.7 8 Fourteen states,7 9 by following the national bank rule allowing banks to sell insurance only in towns with populations of less than

72. The Board stated in the second Merchants National order that:
[A] bank holding company that controls an institution that qualifies as a
"bank" under the definition in the Act is not required, in order to acquire or
retain the shares of the institution, to limit the institution's activities to those
permitted under the closely related to banking standard of section 4 (or one of
the other limited exceptions in the Act), except where the record demonstrates
an evasion of the Act, such as presented in the Citicorp (South Dakota) case.
Merchants, 75 Fed. Res. Bull. at 391 (emphasis added).
73. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 51-18-30 (Supp. 1989).
74. S.D. CODIFmD LAWS ANN. § 51-16-41 (Supp. 1989).
75. IND. CODE § 28-1-11-2 (1988).
76. While the Board's result in Merchants National was not based on an "underwriting"
and "agency" distinction, the limited nature of the powers granted by Indiana law (beyond
the federal standards, but far short of South Dakota's nationwide insurance powers) very
likely played a role in the result reached. In the policy debate concerning whether or not banks
should enter into the insurande business, a sharp distinction is drawn between banks as
"agents" and banks as "underwriters." See Huber, supra note 38, at 149 (1989) (arguing that
the brokerage and underwriting distinction should serve as a controlling factor in determining
the proper scope of insurance activities of banking organizations).
77. Implications of the Merchants National Case: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
FinancialInstitutionsSupervision, Regulation and Insurance of the House Comm. on Banking,
Finance and Urban Affairs, 101s( Cong., 2d Sess. 75 (1990) (Table included in April 4, 1990
statement of James E. Gilleran on behalf of the Conference of State Bank Supervisors
indicating that twelve states allow state-chartered banks to engage in general insurance brokerage
activities).
78. Id. (Indicating that North Carolina, South Carolina and South Dakota allow banks
generally to engage in underwriting, while Delaware and Utah grant grandfathered institutions
underwriting powers).
79. Id.
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5,000 people, 0 evade the state powers question by reflecting the BHC Act

standard. 8'
An alternative approach to the direct bank insurance activity at issue in
the Citicorpand Merchants National petitions is indirect involvement through

the creation or acquisition of an insurance subsidiary by a holding company

bank. Until recently, the express policy of the Board8 2 promoted the use of
subsidiaries by allowing state banks, through their affiliates, to engage in

any activity-without Board approval-that could be conducted by the
parent bank directly.83 Garn-St. Germain's removal of most insurance powers
from the scope of the "closely related" exception of the BHC Act in 1982,
and a perception by regulators that further expansion of state powers would

completely undermine the nonbanking restrictions of the BHC Act, influenced the Board's proposal in 1988 to rescind state bank authority to
acquire operating subsidiaries without Board approval.Y
The complexity of the bank-insurance subsidiary question is illustrated by

the recent AMBAC casea5-the catalyst for the Board's rescission proposal.
The AMBAC case arose out of a challenge by the American Insurance

Association to an interpretive letter of the Comptroller of Currency

6

80. The scope of the National Bank Act provision, 12 U.S.C. § 92 (1988), allowing
insurance agency activities for national banks in towns with populations of less than 5,000,
has been the subject of considerable debate. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
(OCC) has adopted the position that the market area for the sale of insurance under the rule
is not geographically restricted. The only restrictions are that (1) the office out of which the
insurance product is offered be located in a town with a population of less than 5,000 persons,
and (2) the bank not sell insurance for a company to customers in a state where the insurance
company is not authorized to do business. Comptroller Staff Interpretive Letter No. 366,
[1985-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 85,536 (Aug. 18, 1986). This
interpretation of § 92, known as the Comptroller's loophole, is currently being challenged by
the National Association of Life Underwriters, an insurance industry trade group. See M.
CAPATmES, A GumE TO Tm CAPITAL MARKETS AcTivrrms OF BANKs AND BANK HOLDING
COMPANIEs 247 (1990).

81. Exemption C of the Garn-St. Germain Act amended the BHC Act to include an
insurance agency exception for banks located in small towns with populations of less than
5,000. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8); 12 C.F.R. § 225.25(c)(8)(iii) (1990).
82. The Board's policy was to allow state banks to acquire wholly owned operating
subsidiaries without Board approval under the BHC Act so long as the wholly owned company
engaged only in activities that could be conducted directly by the state bank. Rescission
Proposal, 53 Fed. Reg. 48,915, 48,916 (1988). The Board's state bank operating subsidiary
rule, 12 C.F.R. § 225.22(d)(2)(ii) (1990), was adopted in 1971, 36 Fed. Reg. 9292, to allow
competitive equality between independent and holding company banks and because there was
no evidence that acquisitions were resulting in "evasions" of nonbanking restrictions. Rescission
Proposal,53 Fed. Reg. at 48,916.
83. Rescission Proposal,53 Fed. Reg. at 48,916.
84. Id. at 48,915.
85. American Ins. Ass'n v. Clarke, 656 F. Supp. 404 (D.D.C. 1987) rev'd in part, 854
F.2d 1405 (D.C. Cir. 1988), modified on reh'g per curiam, 865 F.2d 278 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
See generally 4 Banking Law (MB) § 88.0216][h] (1990) (tracking history of the AMBAC case).
86. Comptroller Letter No. 388, [1985-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH)
85,508 (May 2, 1985).
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approving Citibank's proposed acquisition of the American Mutual Bond
Assurance Corporation (AMBAC). The Comptroller had approved the
acquisition on the ground that AMBAC's guarantee insurance on low-risk
municipal bonds was functionally equivalent to issuing a standby letter of
credit,8 8 a traditional banking activity. Additionally, and more important
for analytical purposes, the Comptroller also concluded that even if the
service amounted to an insurance activity, the operation of AMBAC could
be approved because the nonbanking limitations of section four of the BHC
Act89 are, by means of section 4(c)(5), 90 not applicable to the operating
subsidiaries of national banks. The Comptroller determined that the relevant
limitations on banking powers, with respect to nationally-chartered banks,
are found in the National Bank Act, 91 not the BHC Act.92
The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit disagreed with the second
ground that the Comptroller had advanced in support of the determination
that the BHC Act's nonbanking provisions were inapplicable. 9 Concerning
the BHC Act issue, the court initially determined that Citibank, as a
subsidiary of a bank holding company, fell within the general restriction of
section 4(a)(1), 94 and therefore could acquire AMBAC only after receiving
95
Board approval under the "closely related" standard of section 4(c)(8).
On rehearing, the court held that the nature of AMBAC's guarantee
insurance was a question appropriate only for the Board's 96 consideration,
and vacated its earlier findings concerning the BHC Act.Y
In the wake of the uncertainty left by the AMBAC case, the Board
proposed to rescind the provision of Regulation y98 that permits a state

87. American Ins. Ass'n, 656 F. Supp. 404 (resulting in summary judgment for the
defendant Comptroller and the defendant-intervenor Citicorp).
88. The Uniform Commercial Code defines a letter of credit as "an engagement by a bank
or other person made at the request of a customer ... that the issuer will honor drafts or
other demands for payment upon compliance with the conditions specified in the credit."
U.C.C. §-5-103(1)(a) (1990).
89. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(a)(2) (prohibiting bank holding companies from retaining direct or
indirect ownership or control of any company which is not a bank or bank holding company
or engaging in any activities other than banking or managing and controlling banks).
90. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(5) (ownership prohibitions do not apply to holding companies that
own "shares which are of the kinds and amounts eligible for investment by national banking.
associations.").
91. 13 Stat. 99 (1864) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C., 19 U.S.C.
& 31 U.S.C.).
92. American Ins. Ass'n, 656 F. Supp. at 413-14.
93. American Ins. Ass'n, 865 F.2d at 287-88 (declining to reach the merits of a challenge
to the acquisition as a violation of the BHC Act).
94. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(a)(1) (prohibiting bank holding companies from acquiring direct or
indirect control of any voting shares of any company that is not a bank).
95. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8).
96. American Ins. Ass'n, 865 F.2d at 281-82.
97. Id. at 287-88.
98. 12 C.F.R. § 225.22(d)(2)(ii).
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bank owned by a bank holding company to acquire, without Board approval,
any nonbank company that engages in activities permissible under state
powers, even if the activity is prohibited under the BHC Act.9 Approval

of this proposal, reversing a regulation that has been in place for nearly
twenty years, would significantly expand the regulatory domain of the

Federal Reserve Board by extending the meaning of "holding company
activity" to include the activities of the operating subsidiaries of holding
company banks. Such a result, while consistent with a strict reading of part
of the language of the Board's Merchants National order,' ° would signifi-

cantly reduce both the amount and the breadth of banking activity under
state control. 0'
III.

Is THE STATE DOOR HALF OPEN OR HALF CLOSED?

Because the regulation of insurance has long been recognized as primarily
within the domain of state regulators'02 it is perhaps not surprising that

99. Rescission Proposal, 53 Fed. Reg. at 48,916.
100. While Merchants Nationalmakes a sharp distinction between nonbank subsidiaries and
bank subsidiaries it expressly avoids disclosing the Board's views concerning whether § 4
provisions cover the activities of operating subsidiaries of state banks. Merchants, 75 Fed.
Res. Bull. at 395.
101. In December 1988 the Board requested public comment on whether § 22(d)(2)(ii) of
Regulation Y, 12 C.F.R. § 225.22(d)(2)(ii), "continues to be valid and appropriate in light
of" the Garn-St. Germain Act and the AMBAC decision. Rescission Proposal, 53 Fed. Reg.
48,915. While an informal public hearing was held on the proposal on April 7, 1989, the
Board has yet to determine whether it will adopt the proposal and thereby rescind the statebank subsidiary rule. The Board is scheduled to determine what, if any, further action will be
taken on the proposal in October of this year. Id.
Despite the fact that the bank operating subsidiary rule remains in effect, a recent ruling
by the Federal Reserve Board ordering a Citicorp subsidiary to suspend its insurance activities
indicates that the rule is to be narrowly construed. Narrow construction of the rule, like the
proposal for rescission, reinforces the direct/indirect distinction of the Merchants National
order. In its September 5, 1990 order the Board directed Citicorp to force Family Guardian
Life Insurance Company, a subsidiary of Citicorp's Citibank Delaware subsidiary, to suspend
any insurance activities not permitted under § 4(c)(8). The Board's decision came in response
to a challenge by the Alliance for the Separation of Banking and Insurance to Citicorp's
attempt to take advantage of a recently-enacted Delaware statute which allows state-chartered
banks to sell insurance through a separate division, department or subsidiary. The Board
concluded that even though Delaware's statute "on its face ... authorizes state-chartered
banks to provide a full range of insurance services ...

the ...

practical effect of the Delaware

statute is to sanction expanded insurance activities only for an entity that in substance is a
separate corporation and that is not a bank." Fed Orders Citicorp Subsidiary to Rein in
Insurance Activities, 55 Banking Rep. (BNA) 363 (Sept. 10, 1990). While banking industry
trade groups were highly critical of the Board's decision, they did not believe the order
undermined the Merchants National decision authorizing direct insurance activities. Id. at 364.
102. The McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1988) (originally enacted as Act
of Mar. 9, 1945, ch. 20, § 1, 59 Stat. 33), affirmed the states' long standing role as the
primary regulators of the insurance business. Expressly declaring that continued regulation of
the insurance industry by the "several States ... is in the public interest," 15 U.S.C. § 1011,
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some power, as illustrated by the Merchants National order, has been
reserved to the states to define the scope of permissible insurance activities
for the banks they charter. However, as the Citicorp order illustrates, the
federal deference is limited. In the context of bank holding companies, there
is an absence of authority addressing whether state banking powers are
actually reserved to the states, or whether such powers are the result of
federal deference and therefore subject to preemption. 0 3 Continued adherence to the direct and indirect standard of Merchants National would
indicate that the powers are reserved-consistent with principles of dual
power. °4 Expansion of the "evasion" rationale represented by Citicorp
would suggest a strong federal hand in maintaining the commerce-banking
distinction, at the expense of state powers. Passage of the rescission proposal, dictated by the initial AMBAC decision, would enhance the power
of the Federal Reserve Board to reach operating subsidiaries of banks, yet
would affirm the idea of reserved state powers by excluding direct state
bank activities from the scope of the BHC Act.
In evaluating the merits of recent positions taken by the courts and
regulators, it is important to distinguish the political debate from the legal
debate and to note that the states have played a central role in the
development of the nation's banking system. What are now perceived as
basic fixtures of the financial marketplace-branch banking, real estate
lending, trust department operations and transaction accounts-were originally the experimental innovations of the states. The dual system of banking
has long been valued for its ability to strike a balance between innovation
and safe and sound banking practices.'0 - Given the present demands on
financial institutions to compete across both state and national lines,' ° 6 the
need for innovation in the dual banking system remains compelling.

the Act reads in part:
The business of insurance, and every person engaged therein, shall be subject
to the laws of the several States which relate to the regulation or taxation of
such business.
No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any
law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance.
15 U.S.C. § 1012(a), (b).
103. For support of the argument that state banking powers are subordinate to federal
powers, see Butler & Macey, The Myth of Competition in the Dual Banking System, 73
CoRNELL L. Rpv. 677 (1988); see also Statement by Paul A. Volcker, supra note 2, at 202

(emphasis in original) ("[I]t should be clear that new powers [to state-chartered institutions]
...that clearly ... violate the basic separation of commerce and banking... can be curtailed

or overridden by the appropriate federal authorities.").
104. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
105. Fisher, supra note 13, at 370.
106. See M. CAPATms, supra note 80, at 243-44 ("world financial markets are increasingly
served by large institutional 'financial supermarkets.'); Realtors, Insurers Urge Congress to
Close MerchantsNationalLoophole, 54 Banking Rep. (BNA) 723, 724 (Apr. 30, 1990) (arguing
that the EEC accord taking effect in 1992 necessitates further deregulation of the financial
services industry to allow U.S. banks to compete internationally).
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Because the vast majority of state banks are affiliated with holding
companies, the resolution of issues concermng the reach of section four of
the BHC Act is very much a reflection of the viability of the dual banking
system. If state powers are, by nature, reserved powers, state banks are
restricted primarily by the law of the state granting their charter and are
generally free to ignore the strict limits on insurance activities imposed on
bank holding companies by the Garn-St. Germain Act. If state banks in a
holding company are at present simply the beneficianes of federal deference,
then dual banking, like federalism in other contexts, is "reduced to [a]
weak essence. 1 0 7 All exercises of power beyond the scope of national
standards would be subject to federal preemption. All that is clear at present
is that bank holding companies can diversify their services through state
banks, beyond federal limits. How far they can be allowed to go beyond
federal limits is not clear.
CONCLUSION

Against the backdrop of the Federal Reserve Board's deterrmnation in
Merchants National that the restrictions of section four of the BHC Act
do not reach bank subsidiaries of a holding company, the Board's rescission
proposal does not close the door on the power of a state bank to engage
in insurance activities. While the Board's determination in Citicorp did
impose limits on state powers, as subsequent developments indicate, those
limits are most reasonably viewed as territorial restrictions on a state bank's
market, not as strict limits on state discretion. These developments indicate
that while a state cannot expand its economic laboratory to national
proportions, a state can conduct financial experiments in a limited market
without severe federal restrictions-provided that the activities are engaged
in directly by the bank and are not inconsistent with safe and sound banking
practices. In short, bank holding companies can diversify into nontraditional
areas of financial services, beyond federally imposed limits, through state
banks-wherever state laws permit.
By recogmzing that the language of the BHC Act distinguishes between
control and activities limitations, as well as between bank and nonbank
holding company subsidiaries, the Board has articulated a workable structure
that both reserves powers to the states and protects the power of the Federal
Reserve Board to define permissible holding company powers. As this Note
has shown, the distinction between direct and indirect bank powers dictated
the result in the Merchants National order and appears to provide an
underpinmng for the rescission proposal. This distinction promotes dual
banking by sharply defining federal and state domains. This reasonably

107 Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 580 (1985) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
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bright line between holding company bank and nonbank subsidiaries eliminates much of the threat posed to dual regulation by the merger of
competing state and federal regulatory structures. 0 8 Additionally, it forecloses the need for administrative and legislative gap-filling to close what
were perceived to be jurisdictional loopholes in the BHC Act.' °9
The regulatory middle ground on which the Federal Reserve Board now
appears to stand, while not protecting the commerce-banking distinction at
the state level, is consistent with the deeply-rooted tradition of dual banking
regulation. It also affirms, at least indirectly, the long-recognized power of
states to regulate and make fundamental policy choices concerning insurance.
Whether state banks retain only traditional bank powers, or whether they
acquire expanded insurance powers, is a matter properly reserved to the
legislatures of the several states. In sum, while adoption of the rescission
proposal may partially close the door on state powers by limiting the ability
of a state bank to conduct insurance activities through subsidiaries, the
Federal Reserve Board has left the door open for state banking authorities
to define direct state bank insurance powers. The Federal Reserve Board's
present regulatory position-as reflected in Merchants National and the
rescission proposal-allows bankers to enter the insurance business, albeit
through a back door opened by individual states, rather than through the
front door of federal legislation which has gradually limited the power of
banks to engage in general insurance activities.

108. Cf. Note, The Merger of Banking and Insurance: Will Congress Close the South
Dakota Loophole?, 60 NoTRE DAME L. Rav. 762, 773 & n.77 (1985) (South Dakota law would

merge competing regulatory siructures into a hybrid scheme of favorable aspects of national
and state law contrary to the dual banking system).
109. Reference to state bank legislation as exploiting a state bank "loophole" in the BHC
Act, a "gap" in federal power, improperly characterizes the state powers question by treating
state banking powers as essentially competing with Board holding company powers. More
precisely, the regulatory issue is the respective domains of complementary authorities.

